> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.ctrlarcz.xyz/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # What a subscription reveals > Every public transaction in a stealth box's life, and exactly which of them still name the payer. A stealth subscription box is owned and vaulted by a one-time address. The cryptography is only half the story: a box also has to be deployed, funded, told apart from every other box, and eventually swept, and each of those is a public transaction with a public sender. This page states exactly which of them still name the payer, so nobody has to infer it from the code. ## Measured, not asserted The shape of a box's life is five public transactions: ``` deploy (SpendPolicyFactory.createAccount) sent by relayer announce (StealthAnnouncer.announce) sent by relayer, caller = relayer fund mint -> box submitted by Circle's forwarder gas relayer -> stealth 0.05 USDC sent by relayer sweep box -> stealth sent by stealth ``` None of the five carries the payer's address. The funding line used to, and it was the one that mattered: it read `PAYER -> box`, both ends indexed, so anyone could take a wallet's outgoing transfers, intersect them with the announcer's metadata and recover its boxes with no viewing key. Measured on a real wallet, that recovered eight boxes out of eight with no false positives. The box is funded through Circle Gateway now. Verified 2026-08-18 on Base Sepolia, box [`0x7da74e31873dEbb59bD006512B01F0f107f55927`](https://base-sepolia.blockscout.com/address/0x7da74e31873dEbb59bD006512B01F0f107f55927), funded in [`0xb4138b81…`](https://base-sepolia.blockscout.com/tx/0xb4138b8177e238193e7c54e23de2c61100b7a4a678b83bc2e1e63a004a566f2f): the box's only incoming movement is a **mint from the zero address**, so the funding line has one end and it is the box. Not even Circle's minter appears as a sender. This is asserted in `testnet.boxfunding.test.ts` rather than left to a reading of the code. An earlier revision of this page traced box `0x3cDB93434d64d08a803694C64f4027Fc7CBFE50E` on Arc and presented it as the evidence for the paragraph above. It is not: that box was funded on 2026-07-28, twelve days before Gateway funding landed, and its record on chain still reads `payer -> box`. It documented the leak, directly under the sentence saying the leak was closed. Left here rather than deleted, because an address that contradicts the claim beside it is the failure mode this page exists to prevent. ## Why the relay is not cosmetic It would be, if it stopped at the announcement. Two of those four were removed for reasons that survive any future privacy upgrade: * `StealthAnnouncer` indexes `msg.sender`. Announcing from the payer's wallet publishes "this address created a stealth box", which is most of what the stealth address was there to hide. * Cancelling used to send the stealth address its gas straight from the payer's wallet. On Arc gas is USDC, so this was a plain, public `payer -> stealthAddress` transfer: not a hint, the link itself. Both are gone, and so is the funding transfer they used to sit beside. Reading Arc no longer connects a payer to their boxes. ## What APS changes, and what it does not [Arc Privacy Sector](https://docs.arc.io/arc/concepts/opt-in-privacy) is a confidential execution environment: a transaction is encrypted to the APS network key and submitted as calldata to a precompile, and the public ledger sees no state, no return values and no event logs. It is on Arc's roadmap and not yet live. APS would close the deposit, which is the last public step the payer takes: moving USDC into Gateway is an ordinary transfer from their own wallet, and inside APS it would not be. It does not close the sender link: the precompile call is still an ordinary Arc transaction with a public `from` that pays public gas. "This wallet submitted a private transaction at this height" stays visible. So the two halves are orthogonal. **APS hides what you did. The relayer hides that it was you who submitted it.** Building the relay now is building the half that APS will not provide. ## The seam APS drops into The three relayed calls live behind one server module, `packages/demo-kit/src/relayServer.ts`, and one client module, `apps/sender/src/lib/relay.ts`. Neither knows anything about how the transaction is carried, only what it should do. When APS is available: 1. `relayServer.ts` encrypts the same call to the APS network key and sends the ciphertext to the privacy precompile instead of calling the contract directly. The endpoints, validation and quota are unchanged. 2. The Gateway deposit moves inside APS as well, so the one step still submitted by the payer's own wallet stops being a public transaction too. 3. Discovery keeps working as it does today, or gets cheaper: with events private, the announcement registry can be read from private state instead of scanned. Nothing about the contracts has to change. `SpendPolicyFactory.createAccount` takes no `msg.sender`-dependent path and `StealthAnnouncer.announce` only emits, which is what let a relayer take them over in the first place. ## Where the trust actually sits * **The relayer cannot take anything.** `createAccount` and `announce` cannot move funds, and the gas top-up is a fixed 0.05 USDC of the relayer's own balance, skipped when the address already has enough. It carries transactions; it never holds money and never holds a key that could reach yours. * **The co-signer cannot hold anything.** It can refuse a pull, which stalls a subscription, and that is the whole of its power. Bringing the money home needs only the payer's own key. * **APS is enclave-based.** When it lands, its confidentiality will rest on hardware attestation and a threshold key held across validators, not on a proof anyone can check. That is a different assumption from zk, and worth stating rather than blurring. The one-line version: **nothing on Arc connects you to your boxes.** This documentation is built and hosted on [Mintlify](https://mintlify.com), a developer documentation platform.